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ABSTRACT
From the beginning of the history of AI, there has been interest in
games as a platform of research. As the field developed, human-
level competence in complex games became a target researchers
worked to reach. Only relatively recently has this target been finally
met for traditional tabletop games such as Backgammon, Chess
and Go. This prompted a shift in research focus towards electronic
games, which provide unique new challenges. As is often the case
with AI research, these results are liable to be exaggerated or mis-
represented by either authors or third parties. The extent to which
these game benchmarks constitute “fair” competition between hu-
man and AI is also a matter of debate. In this paper, we review
statements made by reseachers and third parties in the general
media and academic publications about these game benchmark
results. We analyze what a fair competition would look like and
suggest a taxonomy of dimensions to frame the debate of fairness
in game contests between humans and machines. Eventually, we
argue that there is no completely fair way to compare human and
AI performance on a game.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Computingmethodologies→Philosophical/theoretical foun-
dations of artificial intelligence; •Applied computing→Com-
puter games.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Games have a long history of being used as Artificial Intelligence
testbeds and benchmarks. The formalized representation, especially
of board games, and the often explicit and clear reward structure
makes them well suited for AI approaches. With recent advances
in AI research there is also an emergent narrative that general
game playing, i.e. playing a range of different games with the same
agent, is a necessary stepping stone towards Artificial General
Intelligence (AGI) [39, 57]. Setting this question aside, we want to
focus on another related question: Are games a good way to test if
an AI has human-level intelligence?
This question is often brought up, given that humans are widely
accepted to be the only known example of general intelligence.
Surpassing or at least achieving parity with human-level artificial
intelligence seems to be a necessary step to reach AGI, and what
better way to demonstrate this then to beat a human (or the best
human) in a “fair” competition of intelligence, i.e. beat them in a
game? Consequently, the media, and to some extent the scientific
literature, often characterizes human-AI game competition as a way
to determine if an AI has finally reached human-level intelligence.
The central argument presented in this paper objects to this
characterization. We argue that there is no, and that there can never
be a “fair” comparison between an AI and a human that answers the
question if an AI has human-level intelligence. Building up to this
argument, we will first give a short survey of how human-AI game
competitions are currently portrayed, both in the media and in
scientific literature. We will then look at several existing examples
of human-AI game comparisons and demonstrate why it is hard
to establish a fair comparison for those specific examples. Based
on these examples we will then make a more general argument,
outlining how the range of different AIs is just too wide to find
any game that offers a fair comparison. As a corollary, we can say
that for something to have human-level AI in a meaningful way it
would have to be human, or very close to human, in both physical,
mental and social embedding.
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2 PORTRAYAL OF AI GAME BENCHMARK
ACHIEVEMENTS
To set the stage for our discussion about benchmarks comparing
AI and humans, we will look at important AI benchmarks in classic
board games such as Backgammon, Chess an Go, as well as modern
electronic games. We will inspect the claims that were made by the
original authors of the systems that achieved success in these game
benchmarks, and how those results were subsequently discussed in
the general media and follow-up academic papers. As an analysis
tool, we will use previously published guidelines on how to write
about AI research such as [3] and [40]. Our goal in this section is
to illustrate how game AI benchmarks are perceived by society,
and what the main concerns regarding the fairness of comparison
between human and AI programs are.
Note that the examples gathered in this sections are not meant
as a statistically representative sample of all that has been written
about each of these achievements.
2.1 TD Gammon
TD-Gammon [48] is a Backgammon-playing program developed
by Gerald Tesauro at IBM using temporal-difference learning, a
reinforcement learning technique where a neural network is trained
through self-play to minimize the difference between its prediction
of the game’s outcome and the actual outcome over successive
game states. Between 1991 and 1992, it played over a hundred
games against some of the best players in the world across three
different versions of the software. The last version (TGD 2.1) came
very close to parity with Bill Robertie, a former world champion,
losing a 40-game series by a difference of a single point.
Tesauro highlights that observing the algorithm play has led to
a change in how humans evaluate positions, especially in opening
theory for the game. In particular, with some opening rolls, the
system preferred "splitting" its back checkers rather than the more
risky, but favored at the time, option of "slotting" its 5-point. Since
then, the splitting opening has been confirmed as the superior
choice by computer rollouts and is now the standard choice for the
2-1, 4-1 and 5-1 initial rolls.
When discussing applicability in other domains, Tesauro lists
robot motor control and financial trading as potential applications
while cautioning that the lack of a forward model and the scarcity
of data might limit the success in these real world environments.
Not much discussion of TD-Gammon’s achievements was found in
general media dating from the time of its release, but Woolsey, an
analyst in Tesauro’s paper [48] states that TD-Gammon’s algorithm
is “smart” and learns “pretty much the same way humans do”, as
opposed to “dumb” chess programs that merely calculate faster
than humans. It is interesting from a historical perspective to see
that the distinction between real or human-like intelligence and
mere calculations was already a concern even before Deep Blue’s
success in Chess, which we examine next, brought the issue to the
forefront.
2.2 Deep Blue
Deep Blue [7] is a program and purpose-built computer for playing
chess, designed by a team at IBM led by Murray Campbell. It uses
a combination of specialized hardware and software, such as tree-
search augmented by heuristics for pruning and state evaluation
crafted by human experts. It also uses a database of opening moves
and endgame scenarios to select moves at the start and end of
a match with little computational effort. It achieved enormous
visibility in 1997 when it defeated the reigning champion Garry
Kasparov in a six-game match with tournament rules by a score of
3 12 − 2 12 . Kasparov had previously beaten a former version of the
algorithm in 1996 by a score of 4 − 2.
In their paper describing the system [7], the authors refrain
from making speculative claims about the algorithm or its impact
on the future of AI. However, the same cannot be said about the
media. One article from the Weekly Standard, with the ominous
title “Be Afraid” [54], on the one hand claims that the system’s
“brute force” approach in the first game is mere calculation and “not
artificial intelligence”, but on the other hand attributes brilliance,
creativity and humanity to a win in the second game from a position
that allegedly did not benefit as much from brute-force calculation.
They also speculate on the real-world applications of Artificial
Intelligence by imagining a scenario where machines might become
“creatures sharing our planet who not only imitate and surpass us
in logic, who have perhaps even achieved consciousness and free
will, but are utterly devoid of the kind of feelings and emotions
that, literally, humanize human beings”.
Other commentators, such as in this New York Times article [49]
characterize both Deep Blue and the human brain as information
processing machines, with the main difference being that Kasparov
and humans have feelings such as fear and regret. While Deep
Blue has no such feelings, the authors speculate that in the future,
more sophisticated machines (which they name “Deeper Blue” and
“Deepest Blue”) might be able to model its opponent and even have
life goals outside of chess, such becoming famous, and even achieve
consciousness. Ironically, they speculate that the machine might
then be vulnerable to psychological warfare, at which point humans
would again stand a chance in a game of chess.
Another article, also from the New York Times [50] highlights
Kasparov’s own comments not only on the psychological differ-
ences such as fear, but also physical differences such as the need
to rest. Kasparov also argues that previous games by Deep Blue
should have been made available prior to the match. This final
remark might be justified by the fact that Deep Blue’s “opening
preparation was most extensive in those openings expected to arise
in match play against Kasparov”, although ultimately “none of the
Kasparov-specific preparation arose in the 1997 match.” [7].
The biggest takeaway from Deep Blue’s success is that the game
of chess had held, to some extent, the status of a “representative
measure of both human and computer intelligence” [11]. When a
conceptually simple algorithm was finally able to convincingly beat
one of the best players of its time, the implications of this feat were
widely discussed, includingwhether or not the victory was achieved
under fair circumstances, considering the differences among the
systems (human feelings, exhaustion), the amount of preparation
time and the nature of the underlying reasoning systems, that is,
the difference between supposedly sophisticated human reasoning
versus brute-force calculations.
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2.3 Alpha Go, Alpha Go Zero and Alpha Zero
In 2016, AlphaGo [43], an agent developed by group of Google
DeepMind researchers led by David Silver, became the first program
to beat a human champion of Go in a match against Lee Sedol, in
which AlphaGo won by 4 − 1. The game had been considered one
of the next big challenges for game AI after chess, due to its large
search space and the difficulty to craft a good state evaluation
function that accurately predicts the winner of each position.
The system achieved success through a combination of Monte
Carlo Tree Searchwith convolutional neural networks, which learned
from professional human games and self-play. In 2017, they an-
nounced a new version, AlphaGo Zero [45], which learned entirely
from self-play, with no human examples, and which was able to
beat the previous AlphaGo version (AlphaGo Lee). Still in 2017,
they announced AlphaZero [44], which uses a similar architecture
(but different input representations and training) to beat other top
engines in Go, Chess and Shogi.
The authors claim that the later versions of the system, (i.e.,
AlphaGo Zero and Alpha Zero) master the games without human
help, or Tabula Rasa. These claims were scrutinized in a paper
by Gary Marcus [23], who views the agent not as learning from
a “blank slate”, but as an example of hybrid system that benefits
both from learned behaviors and from prior human knowledge that
contributed to the system. In particular, he points out the inability
of the system to generalize to variations of the gamewithout further
training. The system is also unable to learn the paradigm of tree
search or the rules of the game, which humans are capable of.
In the general public sphere, AlphaGo and its successors also
received wide media coverage. While Deep Blue raised questions
about the nature of intelligence due to its conceptually simple “brute
force” approach, discussions about AlphaGo and its successors are
more focused on:
• the claim that it uses comparatively less human supervision
and expertise and
• the fact that it can learn from large amounts of data.
The first point leads into a perception of it being both more
general and less controllable, which raises questions of automation,
job loss, general intelligence, creativity and the need for supervision
and interpretability. The second leads to concerns about privacy
and bias when systems using similar techniques are applied to more
sensitive domains.
An article from Wired [55] acknowledges the concerns that the
underlying technology behind AlphaGo could be hard to control
and lead to job losses, but ultimately delivers a vision of a relation-
ship between human and machine where they complement each
other, pointing that there are still things machines cannot do, that
players are now able to view the game in a different light thanks to
AlphaGo and highlighting that both Lee Sedol and AlphaGo (and
thus humans and machines) are able to generate “transcendent”
moments, such as the now famous move 37 (by AlphaGo) and move
78 (by Sedol), both of which were evaluated by AlphaGo as having
a probability of being played by a human close to one in ten million.
An article by The Washington Post [34] also looks at move 37, and
asks experts about its implications for creativity. One interviewee,
Pedro Domingos, sees the move as creative. Others, such as Jerry
Kaplan, attribute the move to clever programming, not creativity
of the software.
Another article, titled “Why is Elon Musk afraid of AlphaGo-
Zero?” [56] takes a bleaker view, describing the advancements from
AlphaGo to AlphaGo Zero as an example of the AI becoming “smart
and self-aware” and creating “its own AI which was as smart as
itself if not smarter”. The article goes on to wonder about the risks of
such an AI being able to generalize from data in other domains, such
as in the defense and military industry, and potentially becoming
“unsafe”, again showing concern for what it would mean for a super-
human, uncontrollable AI when applied to non-game applications,
echoing the fear of the “technological singularity” hypothesized by
Vinge [52].
2.4 Electronic games
Electronic games (or video games) offer additional challenges to
AI researchers compared to traditional tabletop games. Due to
a combination of almost continuous time scale (limited by the
system’s frame rate) and potentially huge game state space and
action space, electronic games are typically evenmore intractable by
brute-force search than games such as Go or Chess. As an example,
an estimate by Ontañon et al, [26] estimates the state space of
Starcraft as 101685, its branching factor as 1050 and its depth as
36000, whereas Go has corresponding values of roughly 10170, 300
and 200. As such, a number of video game AI benchmarks have
been proposed. The use of video games as AI benchmarks goes
back a long way but interest in these benchmarks has spiked since
AlphaGo’s results in 2016, because Go, whichwas considered among
the most challenging tabletop games, was finally beaten and new,
harder challenges had to be explored.
Some of these benchmarks encourage the development of gen-
eral techniques, that can be applied for a large number of domain
problems, such as different games. That is the case of frameworks
such as the Arcade Learning Environment (ALE) [2], where agents
can be evaluated in one of hundreds of Atari 2600 games and the
General Video Game AI Competition [33], where agents are evalu-
ated in previously unseen arcade-like games.
Other examples of benchmarks proposed for specific games are
Vizdoom [19] (first person shooter), the Mario AI Benchmark [18]
(platform game) and even benchmarks not focused on winning a
game, but on tasks such as designing game levels in a platform
game [42], building adaptive settlements in Minecraft [38] or, in-
spired by the Turing test, playing in a way that is indiscernible
from humans [14].
While all these benchmarks have garnered academic interest,
none has arguably received as much general media coverage and
player attention as AI challenges using Starcraft (both the Brood-
war [24] and Starcraft II [5] versions) and Dota2 [16]. The fact that
both Starcraft and Dota 2 are popular eSports seems to have helped
garner a lot of attention from the community of players.
Real-Time Strategy (RTS) games, of which Starcraft is an exam-
ple, have been proposed as an AI research environment at least
since 2003 [6] and games of the genre have seen organized AI
competitions since 2006 [26]. Starcraft itself has had yearly AI com-
petitions since 2009, and gained additional popularity as a research
platform after Google DeepMind and Blizzard, the game’s publisher,
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jointly released a reinforcement learning environment for the game
in 2017 [53]. At the time of the first draft of this paper, the state of
the art had been steadily advancing, but humans still had a clear
advantage in the game, even if some observers were betting on an
AI victory in the near future [37].
In the time between this paper’s first draft and final version,
however, DeepMind unveiled AlphaStar [10], their Reinforcement
Learning agent for Starcraft 2 that managed to beat professional hu-
man players TLO and MaNa behind closed doors, before eventually
losing a live showmatch to MaNa. Interestingly, between the closed
door matches that were won and the live event, the developers made
some changes to the agent, which previously could observe the
whole map at once (but not areas covered by “fog of war”) and later
were required to actively control which regions of the map were
observed by moving the camera similar to how a human would.
This can be seen as an effort to minimize one potential source of
unfairness in the comparison with humans, by making the input
and output spaces more similar to the ones experienced by human
players.
The main criticism of the agent came from the fact that it was too
efficient at controlling multiple units at once (also called “micro”),
however Huang [15] argues that, because research in AlphaStar
is meant to help develop techniques that help solve complex real-
world problems, it is a good thing that the agent is able to find a
strategy that leverages its advantages to such extent.
Agents for playingDota 2 have also been target of recent research
and seen significant developments. In 2017, an agent by OpenAI
defeated Dendi, one of the best players in the world, in a limited
1v1 version of the game in a showmatch during an official Valve
tournament [27]. Then, a version capable of 5v5 team play defeated
a team of 5 semi-professional players in the 99th percentile of skill
in another showmatch in 2018 [29, 30] before eventually losing
to professional players in a showmatch during The International
8 [28], the biggest Dota 2 event of 2018.
As happened with Starcraft, the state-of-the art moved between
this paper’s first draft and final print. In April 2019, a new version
of the agent was finally able to defeat OG, the world champion
team, in a live showmatch [31]. The new version was also able to
play alongside (not just against) humans. This version of the bot
was made available for play with and against players around the
world for 4 days, after which the agent held a win rate of 99.4% in
competitive mode, although one team of humans was able to win
10 games in a row against the bots [32].
A major point of debate has been the way the OpenAI agent visu-
alizes and interacts with the game. OpenAI describes the interface
in [29] and it includes high-level features which allow the agent to
"see", at any point in time, information such as the remaining health
and attack value of all units in its sight. A human would have to
click on each unit, one by one, to view this information. Agents can
also specify its actions at a high level by selecting ability, target,
offset and even a time delay (from one to four frames). A human
would have to make a combination of key presses and imprecise
mouse movements to achieve the same effect.
An article on Motherboard [25] has described the advantages
provided to the AI as “basically cheating”, summing up that, while
humans have previously been disqualified from tournaments due
to the use of a mouse with illegal programmable macro actions,
“Open AI Five plays like an entire team with programmable mice
and telepathy”. The article also proposes that the agent should learn
directly from visuals.
In a blog post [9], AI researcher Mike Cook, while ultimately
having a positive view on the benchmark, also comments on the
interface advantages, drawing attention to some highlights of the
games where, even though the agents have a reaction speed of
200ms (in theory comparable to humans), they executed key actions
such as interrupting a spell or coordinating powerful abilities in a
way that is seemingly impossible for humans. Cook also warned
about the potential of the AI to fall prey to situations it has never
encountered in its self-play (such as the technique of “creep pulling”
or unusual hero lineups) and that good performance in a few facets
of the game (such as teamfighting) might give the illusion of greater
overall competence in the game.
A final critique against OpenAI’s agents came from the number
of simplifications that had to be made to tackle a game as complex
as Dota 2, such as playing with a reduced hero pool, the innability
to fight Roshan (a powerful NPC that typically takes risky team-
wide efforts to kill, but drops a valuable reward and is often the
focus of game-deciding fights between teams) and the choice to
have individual invulnerable couriers per player (as opposed to
a vulnerable courier shared by the entire team). These demands
can be seen in game forums such as [21, 36] and ultimately led to
OpenAI’s decision to drop most restrictions (other than the limited
hero pool) in preparation for the final matches at The International
8 (which OpenAI lost) and [28] and against OG (which OpenAI
won) [31].
3 DIMENSIONS OF FAIRNESS
Fairness is a slippery concept to define. Much has been said on
the subject in contexts such as political philosophy [35], economic
theory [17] and even social behavior between primates [4]. A gen-
eral definition of fairness is outside the scope of this paper, but,
in the realm of sports and gaming, a common stance seems to be
that a competition is unfair if one side is substantially favored by
circumstances that should not affect the game.
A version of chess where players started with different pieces
based on how much weight they can lift or how much money they
choose to pay before the match would be considered unfair, as
physical strength and monetary wealth should not affect chess.
However, no one would argue that weight lifting is unfair because
it gives an advantage to the strongest lifters, and some online games
(not without controversy) allow players to pay real money for game
content that can be used against other players. These examples
show both that what exactly constitutes “fair game” is highly game-
specific, and that it is often a matter of debate even within a single
game community.
Peter Stone et al. [46] refer to “preserving the essence of the
game” when discussing what the rules should be for a fair soccer
competition between human and robot players. Preserving the
characteristics that define the essence of the game not only allows,
in their view, for a competition to be seen as fair, but also makes it
so that, if the robots should win, most people would agree that the
robots beat human at soccer (and not some other game that simply
resembles soccer on the surface).
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However, there are multiple ways in which a competition could
be seen as breaking the essence of the game and allowing factors
that should not affect the game to interfere with the results of the
match. While Stone et al. list the rules and restrictions they believe
should apply to their competition (e.g. a robot should not be able to
run much faster than a human can, and should only communicate
with each other through sounds that would be perceptible to the
human ear), our aim in this section is to provide a (non-exhaustive)
taxonomy of dimensions of fairness for human versus AI competi-
tions in general each representing one category of factors that are
often pointed to (in our observations) as the cause of unfairness in
the types of human versus AI competitions in games such as the
ones analyzed in section 2.
Input fairness: do the two systems have the same input space,
e.g. pixels from a screen? This is especially relevant in electronic
games, where it might be the case that a human can only see the lim-
ited information on the screen, and needs to make specific actions
to gather more information, such as scrolling the viewing window
or clicking units to see their attributes. In contrast, an algorithm
might have as input a structured list with the location and status of
game objects. Even in cases where the input is ostensibly the same
(such as an algorithm playing from pixels), is the image capturing
apparatus equivalent to a human eye? As an example, the human
retina has blind spots and lower peripheral resolution [47]. Does
the computer suffer from the same limitations?
Output fairness: do both systems have the same output space,
that is, the same ways of interacting with the world and with other
players? Do they have the same actions to choose from? The same
reaction speed? Does the computer have to actually press physically
buttons or move pieces on a board? Are the systems limited by the
same constraints of strength, speed and precision? In cases where
communication with other players is possible, do they communicate
using the same channels and protocols?
Experience fairness: have the human and the machine spent
the same amount of time playing the game? Have they played the
game under the same conditions? What about time spent playing
closely related games?
Knowledge fairness: have the agents had access to the same
declarative knowledge (compiled by others) about the game? For
example opening books, pre-trained neural networks, tables of state
values?
Compute fairness: do the agents have the same computational
power? How should computational power be measured in this case?
A natural metric to use might be power consumption in watts or
total energy spent in joules, but it has the shortcoming that, in the
case of humans, it is not easy to determine how much power is
being used to play the game as opposed to other essential cognitive
or bodily functions. The issue gets even more complicated when
considering the total energy spent before the match, for example
while learning rules and strategies for the game. We could turn to
other metrics such as the number of neurons or storage capacity,
but it is even harder to establish a meaningful comparison in these
cases. Another alternative could be based on the number or depth
of game states explored during tree search, which tends to heavily
favor computers.
Finally, the monetary cost of the total computation and the infras-
tructure required could also be considered, especially in the context
of discussing the possibility that a machine might replace humans
in a task after achieving “super-human performance”, which is im-
practical if deploying and maintaining the artificial agent is several
times more expensive than hiring a human to do the same task.
Psychological fairness: are agents subject to the same range
of variation in performance due to emotions and states such as fear,
joy, mental fatigue, etc.? Currently, this would seem to only apply
to humans.
Common-sense fairness: do the agents have the same knowl-
edge about other things that may factor into the game? Have they
gone to school? Do they know that dragons are typically dangerous
and coins are typically desirable? Have they seen an American
traffic sign? Do they know that cracked walls are more likely to
break when you bomb them? Do they understand instructions given
in natural language by NPCs? With current technology, this is a
dimension that tends to heavily favor humans.
Note that when it comes to human-versus-human competitions,
the dimensions of input and output are usually explicitly addressed
as a matter of fairness (such as the creation of divisions and leagues
by weight or disability, and the banning of certain performance-
altering substances), but variations in the remaining dimensions are
usually treated as part of individual player skill. A human player
might be praised for having more knowledge of the game, calculat-
ing more moves ahead or handling stress better than their opponent,
but a machine with advantages in the same areas might be seen as
unfair.
Each of the dimensions is actually a continuum rather than a
binary, and, as will be discussed below, not all of them are equally
relevant to all games. Regardless, it should be clear at this point
that even determining what constitutes fairness at a game is a
challenging task. We will argue that achieving complete fairness in
all dimensions would require building a system that is essentially
equivalent to a real, flesh-and-blood human with a full history of
human-like experiences.
4 A DISCUSSION OF FAIRNESS IN HUMAN-AI
GAME BENCHMARKS
At a first glance, the issue of fair conditions in between a computer
agent and a human seems more tractable in tabletop games, such
as Backgammon, Chess and Go, than in electronic games. A major
difference between the two domains seems to be that what we
called Input and Output fairness are less relevant in tabletop games.
As an example, AlphaGo required a human facilitator to input the
current board state into the system, and to apply the move selected
by the algorithm to the physical board. Modifying the system with
a camera to read the board state and a robotic arm to move the
pieces might be interesting Computer Vision and Robotic problems
on their own, but it would be hard to argue that it would constitute
a better Go player or that the competition with humans would be
fairer.
Due to this significant difference, we divide discussion below
between tabletop games and electronic games. Issues discussed for
tabletop games in general also apply to electronic games, but the
reverse is not necessarily true.
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Another category that could be considered is that of games
involving direct interaction with the real world, such as the afore-
mentioned Robocup [46], where robots play soccer against robots.
These raise even more questions about fairness in the sensorimotor
sense, as the physical speed, strength, weight and dimensions of
the robots have to be constrained to a similar range than that of
humans. However, an in-depth discussion of this topic is outside
the scope of this paper and we will focus the remaining discussion
on tabletop and electronic games such as the ones described in
section 2
4.1 Fairness in Tabletop games
The first key issue affecting the fairness between human and ar-
tificial players in tabletop games are feelings such as fatigue, fear,
anxiety, etc. In [50], Kasparov comments on the role these factors
can play in a match. Ke Jie [51], another prominent Go player
who has also lost to AlphaGo, stated that psychological factors are
possibly “the weakest part of human beings”. Additionally, sports
commentators regularly build a narrative around the mental fac-
tors going into an important match, especially one where a lot of
pride or money is involved. The magnitude of the psychological
effect is unclear from this brief study, but, to whatever degree it
might change the outcomes, compensating for it is intractable with
current technology. There is no straightforward way to account for
these emotions in a computer simulation, and attempting to do so
(e.g. by artificially injecting noise in the algorithm’s evaluation in
situations of high stress) would defeat the purpose of building the
best possible game-playing systems.
A second issue that can be raised is the use of look-up tables for
specific points of a match, such as the opening and endgame, and
the availability of information about a specific opponent in a match.
These could be seen as a matter of Knowledge fairness. Look-up
tables have been used in Deep Blue [7] and suggested as a potential
improvement for TD-Gammon’s identified weakness in endgame
situations. [48]. The use of similar resources in most competitive
matches between humans is banned, but when playing versus a
computer, should a human have access to the same tables that are
available to the algorithm? Similarly, if an algorithm is capable
of studying examples of human play in general (as is the case for
the original AlphaGo [43]) or even have some of its parameters or
design decisions tuned to face a specific human player (as happened
with Deep Blue [7]), wouldn’t it be fair for a human to review a
large number of games by an artificial agent, receive a detailed
summary of its preferred openings and strategies, perhaps even
inspect the source code?
In the same vein, the use of a forward model to simulate future
game states, as is done during tree search in Deep Blue [7] and the
rollouts of AlphaGo [43] could be considered an issue of Compute
fairness . This could be compared to giving a human a set of extra
boards and pieces with which to simulate potential lines of play
during a match, which is also not allowed in competitive play. An
important observation is that while it is possible for a human to fully
simulate a game of Chess or Go in this way, it is harder to do the
same for games that involve randomness and hidden information,
and simulation becomes even harder for an unassisted human if
the task involves continuous dimensions such as time and distance.
We would like to relate these issues to what is called System 1
thinking and System 2 thinking in dual-process theory [12]. System
1 thinking, often called intuition or heuristic thinking, has been
related in the Reinforcement Learning context to the selection of
actions without lookahead [1], such as using a look-up table for
openings or a neural network pre-trained on a database of game
states. System 2 thinking consists of conscious analytical reasoning,
and has been related to Tree Search [1].While both types of thinking
could be augmented for humans through the use of external tools
such as notes on a piece of paper or extra boards for simulation of
lines of play, an argument could be made following the Extended
Mind [8] that whether such resources are internal or external to
a system makes little difference when considering the system’s
cognitive abilities. Taking this argument to the extreme, we could
imagine a situationwhere a complete artificial game-playing system
is viewed as mere augmentation of a human’s cognitive abilities,
leading to the absurd scenario of a "human versus AI" match where
nonetheless all moves are selected by the same algorithm, one
playing for itself, the other in the human’s stead.
In the opposite direction, we could attempt to reduce the com-
puter’s advantage by restricting what kinds of techniques it is
allowed to use, disallowing the ones that are viewed as inherently
unfair. Ultimately, however, by a line of reasoning similar to the
Chinese Room thought experiment [41] , all of the aforementioned
advantages could be reduced to following instructions on a piece of
paper or doing mere calculations and so no AI achievements could
ever be considered as proof of true mastery in a game.
A final issue, unrelated to the use of a forward model, is the ma-
chine’s ability to generalize what it learned across different games
or variations of the same game. According to Brooks [3], humans
are prone to infer competence from performance. As humans, we
might expect a system that performs as the best Go player in the
world to be competent enough to play on a board of different di-
mensions, or play with a different goal (such as the intent to lose) or
be at least a passable player in another similar game (such as chess).
Marcus [23] points out that this is not the case with most existing
techniques, and addressing this issue is the motivation behind com-
petition frameworks such as ALE [2], GVGAI [33] and GGP [13].
While this doesn’t strictly affect the fairness of competitions based
on playing a single game, with a single ruleset, it is an important
point to consider against the narrative that sees the success of AI
in a new task as evidence that AGI is just around the corner.
4.2 Fairness in Electronic Games
The major difference between tabletop games and electronic games
when it comes to perception of fairness seems to be rooted on
the representation of the observation and action space, as well as
reaction time, as discussed in [9, 25]. These are related to what we
call Input and Output fairness.
Regarding the observation space, a common paradigm suggestion
to achieve greater fairness is playing the game from pixels, rather
than from higher level game features. This is the approach followed
by Vizdoom [19] and ALE [2]. While the approach can be said to
more closely emulate the way humans perceive video games, the
comparison is not perfect.
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On one hand, favoring the AI, questions such as “is the distance
between these two objects smaller than the range of my spell?” are
still much easier to answer accurately for an agent playing from
pixels than for a human. On the other hand, when a human sees
pixels in the shape of a coin, a spider and fire, they can reasonably
infer that the first object has to be collected, the second attacked and
the third avoided, and such heuristic would work well for many
games (what we call the common-sense dimension of fairness).
Embedding this representation and real-world knowledge in a visual
AI system is an unsolved problem, which provides humans with an
advantage that is not easy to surmount at the moment.
While objections to high-level representations are valid, taken to
the extreme, these objections would imply that no meaningful ad-
vancements could bemade in video game-playing AI before the field
of computer vision is essentially solved. This would be disappoint-
ing from a game AI perspective. After all, low-level recognition
of pixel patterns is not what immediately comes to mind when
we picture a human expertly playing a game. Results obtained on
less structured or more general representations can arguably be
characterized as more impressive, but the challenges involved in
dealing with lower level representations don’t necessarily capture
what makes games such interesting AI problems in the first place.
For this reason, considerations about the input representation
shouldn’t be a barrier for game AI research, especially in environ-
ments where humans currently have the upper hand. We believe
novel results using higher level representations are important, and
further research that attempts to replicate these results while using
less favorable or more general representations are also important
and will likely naturally follow the initial results.
Similarly, the representation of the action space can take many
forms, such as high-level representations like used in OpenAI’s
methodology [29] where an action is viewed as a tuple (e.g. [ability,
target, offset]), a simulation of user interface commands such as
screen movements and unit highlighting in Starcraft [53] and the
direct simulation of aa virtual controller as in ALE [2]. The extreme
position would be to insist on a robotic armmanipulating a physical
controller or keyboard, which would again distract researchers from
other legitimate game AI problems that can be tackled with higher
level representations.
Excessively fast reaction speed is often cited as one of the factors
that make an agent play in a perceived artificial fashion [20]. A
popular solution, used by OpenAI [29] is to directly enforce a spe-
cific reaction time. Alternate solutions involve the "Sticky Action"
and other methods discussed in [22] for the ALE environment. In-
terestingly, the original motivation of Sticky Actions in that paper
is not to emulate human play, but to provide enough randomness
to the otherwise deterministic ALE environment. This forces the
agent to learn "closed loop policies" that react to a perceived game
state, rather than potential "open loop policies" that merely memo-
rize effective action sequences. Regardless, this also works to avoid
inhuman reaction speeds.
5 CONCLUSION
We have briefly recapitulated some of the most important game
AI benchmark results in the past three decades, for both tabletop
games (Backgammon, Chess and Go) and electronic games (spe-
cially Starcraft and Dota 2) and looked at some of the claims made
by the authors of these game-playing systems and third-party com-
ments made by general media and research communities. From
those, we conclude that there is a tendency to extrapolate from AI
achievements in game Benchmarks to speculation about Artificial
General Intelligence (AGI) scenarios where AI will eventually beat
humans in all or most tasks. We have also seen examples of public
concerns about the fairness of these benchmarks.
We have proposed a taxonomy of dimensions on which to evalu-
ate fairness in a competition between two game-playing systems
(such as a human and an AI agent). We provided examples of how
these apply to tabletop games and electronic games, noting that
there is greater focus on the Input and Output dimensions of fair-
ness for electronic games.
Ultimately, we argue that there are so many possible games, and
so many possible architectures of game-playing agents, differing
so widely in the dimensions of fairness, that it is impossible to
infer human-level intelligence from success in any single game, and
that a completely fair competition can only be achieved against an
artificial system that is essentially equivalent to a flesh and blood
human.
This conclusion should not serve to infer that, if complete fair-
ness is impossible, accomplishments in game-playing AI are mean-
ingless in general, or that benchmarks that feature many differences
between humans and AI along our fairness dimensions have no
value. We observe that, usually, when a significant benchmark is
reached, research often follows in order to make the system less
reliant on human expertise, more sample-efficient, less reliant on
extremely fast reaction speeds and more generalizable to similar
problems, leading to systems with fewer restrictions and wider
applications.
It is also important to highlight that research in AI for games
does not happen in a vacuum, and is often used as a stepping stone
to solve complex real-world problems. While the ability of an agent
to make a large number of actions per minute or to access a vast
amount of information can seem unfair in a game context, this
could be extremely desirable when applied to real-world problems
that require a high frequency of actions and with access to more in-
formation than could conceivably be processed by humans. Finally,
we acknowledge that discussions of fairness can have complex
political implications, especially when it comes to systems with
so-called “super-human” abilities being employed in the real world.
While these considerations are out of the scope of this paper, we
believe this is an important discussion to be had in the research
community.
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